Retirement rules in Hungary: gainers and losers by Czeglédi, Tibor et al.
    
 
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK                           DISCUSSION PAPERS  
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES,  
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES - BUDAPEST, 2016 
 
MT-DP – 2016/31 
 
 
 
 
Retirement rules in Hungary:  
gainers and losers 
 
TIBOR CZEGLÉDI – ANDRÁS SIMONOVITS  
ENDRE SZABÓ – MELINDA TIR
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Discussion papers 
MT-DP – 2016/31 
 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque comments.  
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. 
Retirement rules in Hungary: gainers and losers  
Authors: 
 
Tibor Czeglédi  - Endre Szabó - Melinda Tir 
research assistants at the Databank of the Research Centre for Economic  
and Regional Studies - Hungarian Academy of Sciences  
E-mails:  czegledi.tibor@krtk.mta.hu, szabo.endre@krtk.mta.hu   
and tir.melinda@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
András Simonovits 
research advisor 
Institute of Economics 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
also Mathematical Institute of Budapest University of Technology, Budapest 
E-mail: simonovits.andras@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2016 
 
 
ISBN 978-615-5594-64-9 
ISSN 1785 377X 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
Retirement rules in Hungary: gainers and losers 
 
Tibor Czeglédi – András Simonovits – Endre Szabó – Melinda Tir 
 
Abstract 
 
Though the Hungarian pension system has been suffering from many erroneous rules, in the 
present paper we confine our attention to the rules of retirement in Hungary since 1990. In 
every pension system, there exist two rules which determine how the lifetime contribution 
(which is approximately proportional to the years of contributions) and the retirement age 
influence the benefit amount, respectively. As a benchmark, we use the system of 
nonfinancial defined contributions, simulating a mandatory life insurance and life annuity 
system. More generally, we speak of flexible retirement if adding a year to the contributions 
or the retirement age strongly increases the retirement benefit, opening the way to the 
flexible choice of the retirement age. Due to erroneous concepts, flexibility has only 
functioned in a very imperfect form in Hungary. Before 2011/2012, an exemption rule 
completed the two foregoing rules: if somebody had above the critical value (35–40) of years 
of contributions, he/she could use early retirement without significant benefit reduction. 
Since 2011/2012 two other rules have completed these rules: (a) as an exception, since 2011, 
rule Females 40 has rewarded any woman who had at least 40 years of rights with a full 
benefit; (b) as a rigid rule, since 2012, nobody could have retired before reaching the 
statutory retirement age except for category (a). Taking into account the dependence of 
monthly benefits on the lifetime average valorized wages, we assess the gainers and losers of 
the past and the present systems. 
 
Keywords: normal retirement age, early retirement, years of contributions, rights, flexible 
retirement  
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Nyugdíjba vonulási szabályok Magyarországon:  
nyertesek és vesztesek 
 
Czeglédi Tibor – Simonovits András – Szabó Endre – Tir Melinda 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A rendszerváltás utáni időszakra szorítkozva, a magyar nyugdíjrendszer számos szabálya 
bírálható, de ebben a cikkben csak a nyugdíjba vonulási szabályok okozta torzulásokat 
elemezzük. Minden nyugdíjrendszerben létezik két szabály, amely meghatározza, hogyan 
alakítja a kezdőnyugdíjt  a befizetett járulék (amely jó közelítéssel a szolgálati idővel arányos) 
és  a nyugdíjba vonulási életkor. Kiindulásul az eszmei számla (vagy egyszerűsített, lineáris 
változata) szolgálhat, amely egy életbiztosítási–életjáradékos kényszermegtakarítást utánoz. 
Általánosabban rugalmas korhatárról beszélünk, ha mind a szolgálati idő, mind a nyugdíjba 
vonulási kor emelése jelentősen növeli a nyugdíjjáradékot, s ezzel ösztönöz a nyugdíjba 
vonulás idejének rugalmas megválasztására. Hibás elképzelések miatt ez az ikerelv 
Magyarországon csak nagyon torz formában érvényesült és érvényesül. A fenti két szabályt 
korábban egy engedékeny szabály egészítette ki: átlag fölötti (legalább 35–40 éves) szolgálati 
idő esetén az előrehozott nyugdíjba vonulás nem csökkentette a nyugdíjat. Jelenleg két 
szabály egészíti ki a szabályokat. Az egyik a kivételező: 2011 óta a „Nők40” keretében minden 
nő, akinek a jogviszonya eléri a 40 évet, teljes (csökkentés nélküli előrehozott) nyugdíjat kap. 
A másik szabály a merevítő: 2012 óta az előző kategórián kívül senki sem mehet a korhatár 
alatt nyugdíjba – még csökkentett előrehozott nyugdíjjal sem. Bevonva a keresetek és a 
nyugdíj közti kapcsolatot létrehozó (harmadik) szabályt is, a rugalmashoz képest értékeljük a 
korábbi és a jelenlegi szabályok melletti nyerteseket és veszteseket. 
 
Tárgyszavak: általános nyugdíjkorhatár, előrehozott nyugdíj, szolgálati idő, jogviszony, 
rugalmas korhatár 
 
 
JEL kódok: H55, I14, J26 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The field of pension economics has been characterized by heated debates (e.g. the partial 
privatization of public pension systems or the introduction of basic pensions). In contrast, 
there are four issues of retirement rules in which there is a general agreement (Gruber and 
Wise, eds. 2007). To formulate them, we need to formulate two basic rules which determine 
the increase of the initial pension with the rise in (1) the lifetime contributions (which is 
approximately proportional to the length of contribution) and (2) the retirement age. As a 
benchmark we use the system of nonfinancial defined contributions, simulating a mandatory 
life insurance and life annuity system. More generally, we speak of flexible retirement if 
adding a year to the contributions or the retirement age strongly increases the retirement 
benefit, opening the way to the flexible choice of the retirement age.  
The four pillars of the consensus are as follows: (i) to counterbalance the steeply rising 
life expectancy at age 60, it is important to raise the normal (or pensionable, statutory) 
retirement age; (ii) to raise the expected retirement age, it is important to make the system 
more flexible; (iii) the excessively permissive rule of early retirement does not reduce 
unemployment in the longer run; (iv) the introduction of partial (confusingly also called 
flexible) retirement (where between the full work and full retirement, an employee works in 
x% and is retired in 100–x%) would also increase flexibility.  
Considering the post 1989 Hungarian pension system, a number of its features can be 
criticized. We shall, however, confine our attention to the retirement rules. Our major claim 
is as follows: rather than applying the principle of flexible retirement age, more-or-less 
successful in the international practice, the various Hungarian governments 
modified/distorted it by very permissive or very rigid side rules. (The principle that having 
a flexible retirement rule is socially advantageous in a wide range is a special case of the 
economic principle that the market is generally superior to an administrative distribution.) 
Behind the two rules (concerning the role of the length of contribution and the retirement 
age) there is a third one, connecting the benefit to the average lifetime valorized earnings, the 
influence of which on the benefit can be proportional or progressive. (In valorization, the 
individual earnings of the various years are homogenized by an index of the nationwide 
earnings.) The fourth rule concerns the rise of pension in payment (indexation). In general, 
we skip the third and the fourth rules from now on.  
In a number of countries, including Hungary, the first and the second rules have been 
frequently complemented by an exemption rule: with length of contribution above the critical 
value (at least 35–40 years), there is no reduction for early retirement (seniority pensions). 
In Hungary, rules 1 and 2 are now complemented by two side rules: (a) an exceptional rule: 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
since 2011, every women, who has accumulated at least 40 years of rights (somehow differing 
from the length of contribution), can retire within the framework Females 40, without any 
benefit reduction; (b) since 2012, a stiffening one: except (a), nobody can retire below the 
normal retirement age, even with reduced benefits.1 We shall study the earlier exempting and 
the current exceptional/rigid retirement rules, paying particular attention to the induced 
income redistribution with respect to the ideal system of flexible retirement. We also mention 
that a large share of the workers do not know the pension rules (Simonovits, 2016, Chapter 
12) and even if they knew them, they would not trust them. 
In the ideal system, there are no gainers or losers: everybody is treated fairly. The reality 
is, however, more complicated, therefore in a practical flexible system, there are inevitably 
gainers and losers, who are not individuals but classes of types defined by their common 
retirement age, length of contribution and gross/net average lifetime wage. To avoid any 
misunderstanding, we consider social insurance, therefore we are only concerned with 
statistical averages. In the main text (below Table 1) we give two alternative definitions for 
the gainers and in Appendix 1, do a third one. Here we only shortly refer to them: the 
alternative system gives gainers (i) higher monthly benefits, (ii) lower (i.e. negative) net 
balance and (iii) higher lifetime utility than the flexible system does. Note, however, that 
workers (not knowing even the basic rules) may not see their own situation correctly, 
whether they are gainers or losers. 
A good government has to be satisfied with limiting rather than totally eliminating the 
gains and the losses. In general, we consider balanced systems. (If a system is unbalanced, 
then the workers are also gainers/losers.) The government does not know or does not want to 
know the dependence of life expectancy on the retirement age and the lifetime average wage 
(for example, within a given sex, it does not know that the retirement age signals the expected 
remaining life and with good reason, it does not want to know the mortality difference 
between males and females). Therefore the traditional insurance rules are not fair (see, for 
example, Diamond (2003), Eső and Simonovits (2002), Eső, Simonovits and Tóth (2011), 
and Krémer (2015)) but here we neglect this complication. 
The Hungarian retirement rules have been changing quite erratically since the systemic 
change of 1990. This in itself contributed to the tendency that almost everybody retired as 
early as she/he could. Though the reforms have been introduced with short notice, the female 
and male normal retirement ages rose quite smoothly from 55 and 60 (1996) to 62 (in 2009 
and 2001) respectively, and their common value is still rising to 65 (by 2022). The minimum 
                                                        
1 Another stiffening rule which forbids working beyond normal retirement age in the public sector 
would require further analysis. The collapse of the aging spheres of healthcare, higher education 
and research could only be avoided by exempting the aged medical doctors, professors and 
researchers, respectively. Still another problem would be the treatment of work after retirement. 
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female and male retirement ages, and the deduction rates for early retirement have changed 
quite erratically between 1996 and 2015. The deduction decreased quite fast with the increase 
in the length of contribution and became zero for relatively low length (say 35-38 years) for a 
long period. The previous exempting system increased the budgetary burden, eventually paid 
by the workers. This laxity has disappeared by 2010 and it was expected that a good flexible 
system will be created, which is able to satisfy various individual needs and at the same time 
is sustainable. This is not the case, however, since 2012, there is no early retirement except 
for Females 40. 
Due to the introduction of the two new rules (Females 40 and no early retirement), 
however, the shares of gainers and losers in the present Hungarian pension system are 
unnecessarily high, and similarly high are the relative values of the gains and losses. We only 
give two illustrative examples for the gainers and the losers, respectively. Since the 
introduction of Females 40, many women of age 58–60 have enjoyed early retirement 
without any deduction (they need not pay the reduction of 18–30% for 3–5 years with respect 
to the normal retirement age 62–63.)2 According to Table 11 below, 12% of women of age 58–
59 retiring in 2011, in the first year of the Females 40, had a relatively high net wage and 
pensions, 83.6% of the net nationwide wage vs. 69% of the average pensioner. At the same 
time, another large group of females and males of age 61 with pension rights of 39 years 
could not retire, even paying the due reduction. They are the losers.  (For example, those 
8.4% of the female cohort who retired at the normal retirement age had received only half of 
those benefits.)  We wait with the presentation of the details, but we already emphasize that 
the further rise of the normal retirement age (from 63 to 65 by 2022) will strengthen the 
tensions induced by this system. 
At the end of the Introduction, we shortly compare our results with the earlier Hungarian 
literature. We single out Augusztinovics (2005) and Augusztinovics–Köllő (2008) and 
(2009) who first documented the detrimental impact of fragmented working paths on the 
corresponding pension benefits. Cseres-Gergely (2008) studied the role of incentives in early 
retirement. The Hungarian public pension system was described in a number of publications 
(e.g. Augusztinovics, Gál, Matits, Máté, Simonovits, Stahl, 2002 and  Simonovits, 2008). We 
call attention to the relevant data from Molnár D. and Mrs. Hollós Marosi (2015) on the 
dependence of life expectancy on the wage/benefit and the retirement age. In a 
comprehensive model, Freudenberg, Berki and Reiff (2016) considered the long-term impact 
of recent Hungarian pension reforms, including that of the retirement rules. (According to 
their estimates, the rise of the normal retirement age plus the elimination of early retirement 
reduce the pension deficit by 0.5% of the GDP, while the introduction of Females40 increases 
                                                        
2 We do not consider as unworthy gainers those who started to work at age 15 and probably during 
their entire difficult working lives had very modest wages.  
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the deficit by the same amount.) Various Hungarian papers were published on the special 
problems of the system but we omit them. 
We only sketch the vast international literature in a nutshell. Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1986) published a structural model of retirement from the US public pension system, 
assuming that retirees maximize their lifetime utility functions. Considering the interaction 
of the Social Security and the private pension system with defined benefit, Stock and Wise 
(1990) was able to explain the emergence of two peaks around the earliest and the normal 
retirement ages (62 and 65). Rust and Phelan (1997) analyzed a standard model of retirement 
behavior under the influence of social security and medicare and private wealth.  
A new wave of papers concentrated on other dimensions of the retirement problem from 
the US as well as EU. For example, Chan and Stevens (2004) looked for an answer to the 
question: “How does job loss affect the timing of retirement?”. Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) 
and Manoli and Weber (2016) studied a similar question: “Does raising the early retirement 
age increase employment of older workers?” Perhaps the closest to our paper is Etgeton 
(2016) “Labor Market Frictions, Retirement and Inequality”. We only quote one observation 
(from the abstract): “widespread reform effectiveness is hampered by the heterogeneous 
availability of jobs.” 
The structure of the remaining part of the paper is as follows: Section 2 models a flexible 
pension system (similar to the Swedish, German or the Slovakian one). Section 3 moves to 
the earlier permissive Hungarian system and Section 4 continues with the present 
(exceptional/rigid) one. Section 5 draws the conclusions. Five appendices complete the 
paper: Appendix 1 formally defines the welfare ranking of any two systems. Appendix 2 
formulates the definition of the partial retirement. Appendix 3 illustrates the dependence of 
the correlation coefficient and the welfare on the fairness of the system on a numerical 
model. Appendix 4 shows illustrative US data on the dependence of the retirement age and of 
the remaining life expectancy at retirement on the income. Appendix 5 contains important 
general Hungarian statistics used to transform figures from absolute into relative numbers.   
2. FLEXIBLE SYSTEM 
First we outline the general framework and then analyze two types of flexible systems: the so-
called nonfinancial defined contribution system and the linear benefit rule. 
2.1 FRAMEWORK 
In every pension system, three main individual variables eventually determine the benefit: 
the length of contribution S, the retirement age R and the average lifetime gross wages w, 
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respectively. (In reality, when the ratio of own wage to average wage varies annually, the 
rules are more complicated, but we skip this complication.) To simplify the analysis, we work 
at constant prices and wages. We only consider a single cohort. We shall generally skip 
disability or survivor beneficiaries but in Tables 4 and 5, in addition to the old-age pensioners 
the former are also considered. We need a function, connecting average lifetime gross and net 
wages: v = T(w). In Hungary, this function will be proportional: v = θw, (θ = 0.66) in 40 
years but now it is still strongly progressive (concave) and this special feature strongly 
influences the initial benefits and benefits in payment. We take into account that the 
expected remaining life expectancy at age R also depends on the gross average lifetime wage 
w: eR,w. (We do not denote that this parameter characterizes a given cohort t, for example, 
those born in year t.) As is well-known, this life expectancy increases with the wage and 
decreases with the age, but more slowly than the age increases. 
Assuming that the pension contribution is proportional to the gross wage (i.e. by 
neglecting the cap on the contribution base effective between 1993 and 2012), and denoting 
the time-invariant contribution rate by τ, the expected lifetime balance of type (R, S, w) is 
given by 
(1)  d (R, S, w) = τw S – b (R, S, T(w)) eR,w , 
where b (R, S, T(w)) is the corresponding benefit function. 
2.2 NONFINANCIAL DEFINED CONTRIBUTION (NDC) SYSTEM 
For an NDC (denoted by index I), the expected lifetime balance is zero for every type, 
therefore the pension rule is defined as 
(2) bI (R, S, T(w)) = τ w S/ eR,w  , where S ≥ Sm and R ≥ Rm , 
Sm = minimum length, Rm = minimum retirement age and the normal retirement age R* does 
not play any role. 
Even in the NDC, the dependence of eR,w on w is neglected, rather it is simply assumed that 
eR,w = eR, therefore (2) is replaced by  
(2’) bI (R, S, T(w)) = τ w S/ eR . 
As a side remark, we note that the estimation of the expected life span at retirement is a very 
difficult problem and in the past decades eR was typically underestimated. 
Table 1 presents how freely chose the new Swedish retirees their retirement ages by the 
end 2013 between age 61 and 71. For example, among the oldest cohort (1938) 77% retired at 
the normal retirement age (65), among the youngest (1948), only 55%. The share of the 
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earliest retirees (aged 61) grew spectacularly:  from 4 (1938) to 7% (1952). Though the main 
benefit rule strongly punishes them, the pension credit mitigates this effect. 
Table 1.  
The distribution of new Swedish retirees aged between 61 and 71, % 
Cohort 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 
1938 3.6 2.3 2.3 2.1 77.3 4.1 3.2 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.1 
1939 3.9 1.9 2.1 2.3 75.6 6.5 2.3 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.2 
1940 3.0 2.1 2.5 3.1 75.8 5.0 2.6 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.2 
1941 2.9 2.2 3.0 3.7 73.2 6.3 2.8 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.2 
1942 3.4 2.9 3.4 3.9 70.9 6.2 3.4 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 
1943 4.0 3.1 3.6 5.3 66.4 7.1 4.4 1.2 0.4 0.5  
1944 4.7 3.4 4.7 5.9 63.2 7.9 4.0 1.1 0.5   
1945 5.1 4.2 5.3 6.1 61.7 7.2 4.0 1.3    
1946 6.0 4.8 5.5 6.7 59.4 6.7 4.3     
1947 6.4 4.6 6.0 7.5 57.2 7.0      
1948 6.1 5.0 6.7 7.9 55.4       
1949 5.9 5.5 7.0 8.8        
1950 5.9 5.5 7.8         
1951 6.6 6.4          
1952 6.9           
Remark. The ratio of newly retired to the potential size, end 2013.  
Source: Swedish Pension System [2014, 26]. 
 
Before turning to imperfect systems, it is worth defining the gainers and losers in a 
system M with respect to the ideal system I. It would be difficult to neglect the dependence of 
outcomes on the effective mechanism M. Therefore we distinguish types in which the points 
of a sufficiently fine 3-dimensional grid are indexed: i =1, 2,…, n; (Ri(I), Si(I), w)  are 
compared to the alternative outcomes (Ri(M), Si(M), w).   
We can give more than one definition for the gainers and losers. 
1. With respect to the annual benefit, system M is better than system I for type i if and 
only if type i receives higher benefit for outcome (Ri(M), Si(M), w): 
bM (Ri(M), Si(M), w) > bI (Ri(M), Si(M), w).  
Remark. If the comparison is made on the basis of I rather than M, then the 
corresponding condition bM (Ri(I), Si(I), w) > bI (Ri(I), Si(I), w) may not hold. 
2. With respect to the net contribution, or lifetime balance, system M is better than 
system I for type i if and only if the net balance is negative for the outcome: 
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dM (Ri(M), Si(M), w) < 0. 
Remark. As before it is not guaranteed that dM (Ri(I), Si(I), w) < 0 also holds. 
The third definition will be given in Appendix 1 below. 
2.3 LINEAR FLEXIBLE SYSTEM 
Formula (2) is further simplified, namely linearized in other cases and gross wage I replaced 
by net wage. For a given earning and length of contribution, the net (i.e. after tax) benefit is 
an increasing linear function of the retirement age: 
(3)  b(R, S, w) = [1+ δ(R – R*)]γ S T(w) , where  R*, δ and γ are positive constants. 
Their names are as follows: R* is the normal retirement age, Rm < R* < RM, δ is the 
delayed/early retirement coefficient, γ is the constant accrual rate in terms of the net average 
wage. Here it is not self evident that the net balance is identically zero: d(R, S, w) = 0, 
therefore we have to require that their expected value be zero. Let pR,S,w  > 0 be the relative 
share of type (R, S, w), their sum is being equal to 1. By definition, in a balanced pension 
system, the expected value of the net balances is zero: 
(4)   ∑pR,S,w d (R, S, w) = 0. 
Inserting (1) and (3) into (4) yields a condition for the system is balanced: 
(5)   ∑ pR,S,w {τw– [1+ δ(R – R*)]γ T(w) e R, w} S = 0. 
We do not consider the problem of balance when it is taken for the whole population 
rather than a single cohort. Simplifying the previous approach, for the time being, we assume 
that the choice of the length of contribution and of the retirement age is independent of the 
system’s parameter values. Then a simple equation is obtained for either the accrual rate γ or 
the contribution rate τ: 
(6)   τ ∑ pR,S,w wS = γ ∑ pR,S,w [1+ δ(R – R*)] T(w) S eR, w. 
To avoid arbitrariness, we have to stipulate that in a genuinely flexible system, the normal 
retirement age R* lies years above the minimum retirement age Rm, years below the 
maximum retirement age RM and the delayed retirement coefficient δ is several percent/year. 
Moreover, there may be a malus δ1 and a bonus δ2 for early and delayed retirement, 
respectively. 
Table 2 displays the flexible benefits for selected employment lengths and retirement 
ages, calculating with normal retirement age 62 valid until 2012 with δ1=0.03 and δ2=0.06.  
For example, if somebody retires at age 60 with 38 years of service, he/she will receive 71.6% 
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of his/her net earning. The benefit in the cell (58, 40) is only 70.4%. We shall base our 
evaluation of the distortion caused in the exemptional/rigid system in Table 8 on this 
calculation. 
Table 2. 
 Linear flexible benefits – retirement ages and length of contribution 
       Years of 
contribution, S 
Retirement age R 
36 38 40 42 44 
58 0.634 0.669 0.704 0.739 0.774 
60 0.677 0.714 0.752 0.790 0.827 
62 0.720 0.760 0.800 0.840 0.880 
64 0.806 0.851 0.896 0.941 0.986 
66 0.893 0.942 0.941 1.042 1.091 
 
We have already mentioned that for simplicity, we generally neglect the impact of real 
earnings dynamics. Here we make an exception, and shortly discuss this issue. If in year t, a 
worker retires at age R with employment length S and average lifetime gross wage wt , 
his/her benefit is equal to  bt(R, S, T(wt)). Calculating with full employment for the last year, 
due to a delay of one year, his/her new entry benefit would be  bt(R+1, S+1, T(wt+1))gt+1, 
where  gt+1 is the growth factor of the net wage from year t to t+1. Applying the pure price 
indexation, this should be compared to bt(R, S, T(wt)). The delay raises the yield of any extra 
year gt+1 –1=0.02, except during the period 2013–2015, when the overindexation of pensions 
in payment amounted to 8%. 
3. SYSTEM WITH EXEMPTION 
We shall relate the system with exemption prevailing until 2012 to the foregoing flexible 
system. Unlike in (3), the value of δ was a sophisticated function of the length of contribution, 
and in a lot of cases, there was no deduction at all: 
(3’)  b(R,S,w) = [1+ δS (R – R*)] γ ST(w) ,  
where  δS is a non strictly decreasing function of the length of contribution: (S=Sm,..,So), δSo 
=0, where So is the critical value of the length of contribution (e.g. 35 or 40 years), implying 
full benefits.  
In such a system with exemption, almost every worker retired as soon as it was possible, 
i.e. when he/she reached the prescribed critical length of contribution So. As is obvious, in 
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such a system, working until the normal retirement age hardly increases the benefit but lifts 
the net balance of contribution.  
By the way, we can obtain a more precise description about the Hungarian pension 
system if we replace γS by a more complex series (cS), representing the accumulated accrual 
rates. Table 3 displays the selected values, between which the function is a linear one (row 2). 
For example, cS = 0.02 S for  40 ≤ S ≤ 50, but for S ≥ 50, cS = 1 (constant); below 40 its slope 
changes haphazardly. For example, for S lying between 36 and 40, cS = 0.74 + 0.015 (S – 36). 
Row 3 gives a hypothetical proportional scheme. In addition, the series of valorized net wages 
(vt) and their progressive (concave) average also play a role. 
Table 3.  
Accumulated accrual rates 
     Length of    
employment (S) 
Replacement  
20 25 32 36 40 
Actual (cS)) 0.53 0.63 0.70 0.74 0.80 
Proportional (γS) 0.40 0.50 0.64 0.72 0.80 
 
In addition to these factors, due to changing rules, (3’) also depends on the calendar year, 
but for the time being, this dependence is neglected. In the Hungarian practice, the length of 
contribution is downward rounded-off from month to years, but the retirement age is given 
in months. The benefit also depends on gender (f=female, m=male)). 
The simplest tool to characterize the distortion, due to the system with exemption, is the 
paradoxically negative correlation between the length of contribution and the retirement age. 
We recall the definition of correlation coefficient between two random variables. Let R and S 
be random variables of the length of contribution and of the retirement age, ER and ES their 
expected values, DR and DS their standard deviations, respectively. Then their coefficient of 
correlation is defined as ρ(R, S) = E [(R–ER) (S–ES)]/[ DR DS]. As is known, this index lies 
between –1 and 1. For a negative correlation, the decrease in the index shows the 
strengthening of the correlation. In the usual one-dimensional framework, we expect strong 
positive correlation but in reality, the correlation is negative. (For details, see Appendix 3 
below.) 
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Using the Data Bank data, we have constructed three figures (Figures 1 to 3). To make our 
figures, we relied on data base Nyugdmeg,3 containing the aggregated pension decisions for 
the period 2003–2010. 
According to Figure 1, the foregoing male correlation was “only” –0.3 in 2003, but it 
dropped to –0.45 by 2007. For females, the situation is even more paradox: it started from –
0.4 and dropped to –0.7 by 2010. This is a sign of the strengthening impact of the exemption, 
neutralizing the rising normal retirement age. 
Figure 1.  
Correlation for those retiring above 54, between 2003 and 2010 
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To exclude outliers, we confine our attention to those who had at least 20 years of 
contribution (the recent minimum value). Similarly to Figure 1, Figure 2 also reports negative 
and time-decreasing correlation, only the values are less extreme. 
Further delimiting the analysis, we only consider those who retired at or above the 
normal retirement age. Figure 3 still reports negative correlation but with low absolute 
values. 
 
                                                        
3 Database Nyugdmeg contains the retirement decisions concerning the period 1999–2010, 
aggregated according to birth year, retirement year and month, gender, length of contribution, 
average pension, and the valorized net earning.  
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Figure 2. 
 Correlation for those retiring above 54, with minimum  
20 years of contribution, between 2003 and 2010 
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Figure 3.  
Correlation for those retiring at or above the normal retirement age,  
between 2003 and 2010 
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We are moving from aggregate statistics to a somewhat disaggregated analysis. We expect 
that in a fair pension system, the benefits are smooth functions of the length of contribution 
and the retirement age. We shall see that this expectation only partly fulfilled.  
Tables 4 and 5 display the relative size and relative benefit of those male and female 
groups who retired in 2011 on their own right, breaking down the data according to 
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retirement age and length of contribution. (Confining attention to old-age pensioners would 
yield similar results.) To have perspicuous tables, we drop the categories with extreme 
lengths of contributions.  Note that the ratio of the number of all new male retirees to that of 
being in normal retirement age is about 97.4% and the replacement rate is equal to 71%, 
reaching its peak at retirement age of 61 with 99%.  
Table 4.  
Relative size of male groups retired in 2011 and of benefits –  
retirement age and length of contribution 
Age Size–Length of contribution Benefit–Length of contribution 
 
35–39 40–44 
(Full 
sample) 
Total 
35–39 40–44 
(Full 
sample) 
Average 
54–55 0.012 0.005 0.033 0.710 0.768 0.627 
56–57 0.012 0.019 0.044 0.769 0.802 0.708 
58–59 0.019 0.110 0.160 0.797 0.826 0.807 
60 0.047 0.239 0.378 0.555 0.753 0.732 
61 0.005 0.021 0.031 0.567 1.118 0.983 
62–63 0.030 0.030 0.160 0.559 1.246 0.667 
Total 0.139 0.422 0.974 0.637 0.827 0.707 
Source: ONYF [2012, p. 109]: Table 9.1. 
 
The related numbers for females: retirement ratio is equal to 135% and the replacement 
rate is equal to 66%, reaching its peak at retirement age 60 with 74%. (Note that 2011 was a 
singular year when the Females 40 was already introduced but the permissive system of early 
retirement was valid. Furthermore, the minimal retirement age of female cohort 1952 just 
rose from 57 to 59.) We call the Reader’s attention to the bifurcation at length of contribution 
of 40. 
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Table 5.  
Relative size and benefits of female groups retired in 2011 –  
retirement age and length of contribution 
Age Size–Length of contribution Benefit–Length of contribution 
 
30–34 35–39 40–44 Total 30–34 35–39 40–44 Average 
54–55 0.004 0.010 0.091 0.115 0.515 0.606 0.638 0.612 
56–57 0.003 0.013 0.336 0.357 0.476 0.623 0.681 0.672 
58–59 0.006 0.089 0.498 0.599 0.455 0.576 0.783 0.747 
60 0.003 0.006 0.017 0.027 0.410 0.576 1.059 0.865 
61 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.415 0.555 1.108 0.739 
62–63 0.027 0.006 0.003 0.113 0.441 0.530 1.103 0.475 
Total 0.065 0.131 0.949 1.347 0.486 0.581 0.739 0.661 
Source: ONYF (2012, p. 109): Table 9.2. 
 
4. EXCEPTIONAL/RIGID SYSTEM 
 
We shall put the present system into a framework and then display its impact by a model and 
tables. 
4.1. FRAMEWORK 
The analysis of the current (exceptional/rigid) system is more important than the previous 
system (with exemptions). Since in the new system the distinction between females and 
males has reappeared, we should double all our equations correspondingly (generally 
omitted). The aggregated balance equations (4) and (5) would be obtained by the summation 
of the two variants.  
 
(1) is replaced by the equation of the favored females: 
(7)  b(R, S, w) = γS T(w)   if S  ≥ 40 and R < R*. 
(1) is modified into the equation below for all the others, retiring in the rigid system: 
(8)   b(R, S, v)  = [1+ δ(R – R*)]cS T(w)  if  R  ≥ R*. 
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There is a further complication: years spent in vocational schools and higher education 
are counted in (8) but neglected in (7). Therefore passing the normal retirement age, the 
female accrual rate jumps by the quantity corresponding to 3–5 years exempted, amounting 
to 7.5–12.5%. This is neglected here. 
Currently (2016), the parameter values of the Hungarian system are as follows: R* = 63 
years: δ = 0.06 and γ = 0.02, Rm = R*, early retirement is only allowed for women, if S ≥ 40 
but without any deduction. Sm = 20 years. 
4.2. FEMALES 40 
Table 6 displays the program Females 40 as it stood in 2013. The largest cohort is of 1955, its 
average retirement age is about 58 years, and its average length of contribution is about 41 
years. The majority retired with 40 years of rights but 15 and 11% with 42 and 43 years, 
respectively. 
Table 6. 
Data of females 40, 2013. 
Birth 
year 
Size 
distri- 
bution, % 
Average 
reti- 
rement 
age 
Average 
length of 
employ-
ment 
Size distribution according to employment length, 
% 
40 41 42 43 44 
1953     4.9 60.0 41.5 37.7 29.4 18.4   4.9 5.1 
1954   26.6 59.0 41.1 59.7 16.1   8.5   8.5 4.4 
1955   32.9 58.2 41.1 61.4   9.3 15.2 10.5 1.7 
1956   17.7 57.1 41.7 31.2 17.4 37.8 11.3 0.0 
1957     9.3 56.1 40.7 65.6 23.6   7.2   0.0 * 
1958     4.7 55.2 40.3 87.1   9.7   *   * * 
Average 100.0 57.9 41.1 56.3 14.8 15.9   8.2 2.0 
Source: ONYF (2014, 111–112. o., Table 6.9) 
 
Table 7 shows the relative benefits of the same categories. The original table also 
demonstrates that those newly retired who were born in 1951 (0.3%) had an average net 
valorized wage of 118%, while those born in 1952 (1.3%) had only 103.5%. Our censored table 
displays that those born in 1956 or later had still lower average net valorized wage of 83.3%. 
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Table 7.  
Relative benefits of Females 40, retiring in 2013 
Birth 
year 
Relative 
average 
earning
, % 
Average 
entry 
benefit 
Average 
length 
of 
rights 
Size distribution according to employment 
length, 
% 
40 41 42 43 44 
1953 
0.93
8 
0.771 40.5 70.6 18.2 6.9 2.3  1.2 
1954 0.954 0.776 40.2 86.9 10.4 1.8 0.6 0.2 
1955 0.954 0.775 40.2 90.2   8.0 1.2 0.4 0.2 
1956 0.793 0.655 40.2 89.8   8.8 1.0 0.3 0.2 
1957 0.792 0.639 40.2 91.7   7.6 0.6 0.0 * 
1958 0.760 
0.60
9 
40.1 95.0   5.0 * * * 
Averag
e 
0.89
7 
0.73
1 
40.2 88.2   9.1 1.5 0.6 0.3 
Source: ONYF [2014, 111–112. o., Table 6.9] censored.  
 
To make the tables shorter, we cut out the less important very early and very late birth years 
(–1952 and 1959+, respectively) and the similarly extremely short and long retirement ages 
(–39 and 45+, respectively), the displayed shares do not add up to 1. Similarly, the averages 
refer to the whole population. 
Less important very early and very late birth years (–1952 and 1959+, respectively) and the 
similarly extremely short and long retirement ages (–39 and 45+, respectively), the 
displayed shares do not add up to 1. Similarly, the averages refer to the whole population. 
 
To widen the analysis, we cite a number of important data from 2012 about the 
dependence of life expectancy on the earning in Hungary from the path-breaking study of 
Molnár D. and Hollós-Marosi (2015). Dropping the lowest decile of pensions (to avoid 
complications stemming from partial pensions received by emigrants), the foregoing paper 
divided the remaining nine deciles into four equal parts. For example, for males, the lowest 
benefits were between 43.2 and 61.2% of average net earning, while their life expectancy at 
60 was equal to 17.1 years. The highest benefits started at 104.3% and the respective life 
expectancy was four years longer. The female earnings were uniformly lower and the life 
expectancy hardly depended on the earning. 
The foregoing study presents interesting data on the dependence of life expectancy and 
the retirement age, too. Unfortunately, the categories are too large, therefore only slight 
differences arise. For example, in 2012 those Hungarian males who retired before reaching 
age 59, had a remaining life expectancy of 14.9 years, while those retiring older than 61, had 
another 16.1 years. (The corresponding demographic numbers are 16.7 and 15.4 years.) For 
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females, those retiring between 50 and 54 years had another 22.5 years, while those retiring 
beyond 61 years, live only slightly longer: 23.1 years.  (Note that the unofficial data of Eső, 
Simonovits and Tóth (2011) cited much larger differences for those who died in 2004.) 
One of the main issues of the present paper is as follows: what is the impact of the 
elimination of early retirement except for Females 40? Table 8 translates the model 
calculations of Table 2 to the exceptional/rigid system. Rows 4-6 are dropped, since they are 
identical to those of Table 2. Returning to our earlier examples: 0 benefit stands in cell (60, 
38), while for females, the cell (58,40) jumps from 70.4 to 80%!  This is obviously unfair. 
Table 8.  
Exceptional/rigid benefits – retirement ages and length of contribution 
(females) 
Years of 
contribution, S 
Retirement age R 
36 38 40 42 44 
58 0 0 0.80 0.84 0.88 
60 0 0 0.80 0.84 0.88 
 
4.3. REAL OUTCOMES 
It is worth presenting some data on real outcomes. Sampling well-known statistics, first 
Table 9 displays the characteristics of females, females 40 and males between 2006 and 
2014. The outcome is chaotic.  The relative size of newly retired cohorts developed erratically. 
For example, in 2010, the number of newly retired females was equal to 20% of the number 
of those females of normal retirement age, while in 2011, it jumped to 119%.  In 2007, 101% of 
males retired, while in 2014, only 54%.  Of course, everything can be explained by the erratic 
developments of the rules. In 2010, females delayed their retirement until the much more 
favorable era starting in 2011. In 2007, males (and females) surpassed the sudden decrease of 
8% in the entry pensions announced for 2008, in 2014, the normal retirement age rose by ½ 
year.  
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Table 9.  
Retirement ages and benefits: females, females 40, and males 
Year 
Females Females 40 Males 
Average  
retirement 
age (year) 
Relative 
size 
Average  
retirement 
age (year) 
Relative 
size 
Average  
retirement 
age (year) 
Relative 
size 
2006 57.5 0.888   59.9 0.544 
2007 57.8 1.233   59.7 0.844 
2008 57.3 0.829   59.8 0.400 
2009 59.9 0.298   59.7 0.582 
2010 60.7 0.247   60.2 0.541 
2011 58.5 1.479 57.6   0.769* 60.3 0.608 
2012 59.1 0.889 57.8 0.374 62.0 0.299 
2013 59.5 0.670 57.8 0.329 62.2 0.289 
2014 59.3 0.599 58.2 0.360 62.2 0.201 
Source. Fazekas–Varga (2015, p. 262, Table 11.5).  
*Oral communication: The number for Females 40 in 2011 also contains  
those who retired earlier but were reclassified in 2011. 
 
4.4. DETAILED OBSERVATIONS 
Due to the Attached Administrative Data Base, we can obtain a more precise picture on the 
situation of the newly retired females between 2002 and 2011. Taking into account our topic, 
we shall distinguish three types of old-age retirement: early retirement, Females 40 and 
`normal´ retirement (ironically referring to the rare retirement at the normal retirement 
age). We shall compare now the three groups (with respect to fragmentation of career, 
earning before retirement and the entry pension). 
A lot of statistics attest that the share of early retirees was always quite high; moreover, 
normal retirement is an exception rather than the rule. The changes in the average retirement 
age only follow the changes in the law. Already commenting Table 8 we called the Reader’s 
attention to the critical role of length of contribution 40, and to the inequalities in benefits 
(present between those who retire with 35-39 and 40-44 years of contribution, respectively). 
FURTHER DETAILS 
Applying our administrative data, we were unable to take into account the length of 
contribution but we relied on the entry pensions and the earnings before retirement. 
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According to Table 10, the participants in Females 40 had as benefits 77.2% of the average 
net wage, somewhat lagged behind those of early retirees (82,2%) but by far surpassed those 
of the ‘normal’ retirees (43.2%).  
Table 10.  
Female pensioners of 2011-ben: average last earning and initial benefit 
Type of retirement Relative 
average benefit 
Share % Relative 
average 
earning 3 
months before 
retirement 
Share of 
employed 3 
month before 
retirement 
Females 40 (54-
59) 
77.2 43.5 128.9 39.7  
Early pensioners 82.2 17.8 156.5 10.3  
Females retiring at 
the normal 
retirement age 
43.2   6.1   80.2   1.3 
 
 
Table 11 breaks down into three age-groups those pensioners who retired in the first year 
of starting Females 40. With the rise of the retirement age, not only the replacement rates but 
also the relative value of pre-retirement net wage with respect to the average net wage grew 
steeply: 76.5% (aged 54-56) vs. 94.8% (aged 58-59). 
Table 11.  
The pension and pre-retirement date of Females 40 in three age-groups 
Retirement age Relative 
average 
benefit 
Relative size Ratio of gross 
wage to the 
average one 
The size of 
workers 3 
months  
before 
retirement 
54-56  0.701 0.184 0.765 0.173 
57  0.744 0.163 0.802 0.149 
58-59  0.836 0.260 0.948 0.236 
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Looking at Figure 4 (obtained by combined administrative database4) it is evident that the 
earlier (i.e. at the younger age) one benefited from Females 40, the lower her benefit and last 
earning. Comparing the beneficiaries of Females 40 with non-retired workers of the same 
age, we find the following difference: until age 57, the latter earn more than the former, but at 
age 58, the situation is reversed. Knowing this tipping point, the birth-cohort dependence of 
pension and earnings depicted in Table 6 becomes clear. We also note that those retiring at 
the normal retirement age are even at worse situation. 
Figure 4.  
Monthly average wages in May 2010 at an annual percentage  
of the average wage in 2010. 
50
60
70
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90
100
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Not retired women Women 40
 
 
Table 12 summarizes the data of females retired in period 2012–2014. We emphasize that 
in all the three years, the number of those retiring in Females 40 was 1.5-3 times higher than 
those at or above the normal retirement age; they were 4-5 years younger and the difference 
between the contribution lengths of the two categories dropped from 14 to 11 years. Through 
the zigzagged accrual schedule, the loss of the second category was somewhat lower than 
suggested by Tables 2 and 8, it remains severe. 
                                                        
4 The combined data base was created by the combination of five administrative organizations’ data. 
It contains the labor force data of 50% of the Hungarian population between 15 and 74 years, in a 
monthly breakdown of the period 2003–2011. To make our calculations, in addition to labor force 
and transfer data, we analyzed the NYUFIG data.  We have created a detached database, which 
contains the benefit decision and payment, furthermore, it unifies the benefit amount on an annual 
base. 
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Table 12.  
The most important characteristics of female retirees, 2012–2014 
Year Type Size Average 
age (year) 
Average 
length of 
contribution 
(year) 
Average 
replacement 
2012 Reaching 
NRA 
0.144 62.6 26.0 0.450 
Females40 0.389 57.8 40.7 0.772 
2013 Reaching 
NRA 
0.195 62.3 28.1 0.485 
Female40 0.324 58.0 40.7 0.731 
2014 Reaching 
NRA  
0.130 62.8 30.2 0.522 
Female40 0.374 58.3 40.9 0.742 
Source: ONYF (2016, pp. 51–53, Table 4.1). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this Section we summarize the results obtained and draw some conclusions. It is almost a 
commonplace that in a fair system––in addition to the average lifetime earning and within 
wide limits––the entry benefit is a strongly increasing function of the length of contribution 
and of the retirement age. (In fact, considering the pension contribution as forced saving, in 
the resulting life annuity, both the lengths of saving and dissaving periods are important.) 
This principle is obvious in most countries but not in Hungary: either the employment length 
or the retirement age is decisive.  Before 2010, every man or woman with sufficiently long 
employment was allowed to retire with full benefit. Since 2011, having accumulated 40 years 
of rights, every woman can retire without any deduction. On the other hand, except Females 
40, nobody can retire before reaching the normal retirement age. For example, in 2016, even 
39 years of right does not allow a 62 year-old woman to retire––even ‘paying’ serious 
deduction. 
Both the public statistics and our administrative data reveal the significant distortion 
implied by the neglect of either the retirement age or the length of contribution in the 
calculation of benefits. Our data underline the surprising fact that in the system with 
exemption, there is a negative correlation between these two variables. Typically, the later 
one retires, the shorter is his employment. This was only possible because a large part of the 
workers––frequently unintended––worked with long breaks. We conjecture that this 
negative correlation survived after 2011 but we cannot document it. 
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The beneficiaries of Females 40 form a basically heterogeneous group. Breaking down the 
group by age (and the underlying education level) one can distinguish two subgroups: one is 
disadvantaged (aged 54-56) and another is advantaged (aged 58-59), the latter’s members 
resemble the early retirees.  Already in 2016, every woman with a university diploma will 
have the 40-year of right at the age 63 and then the rigid prohibition of early retirement does 
not affect her. True, there remains a 5 year-long difference between the lengths of 
contribution and of the right, diminishing by 12.5% of the extra benefit at reaching the 
normal retirement age. But this would be too little to deter joining Females 40 when the 
normal retirement age rises to 65. 
Using the data of the Central Statistical Office and the Central Administration of National 
Pension Insurance we analyzed the post 2010 situation. We emphasized that the Females 40 
gives a significant advantage to a lot of women and causes also significant and unfair 
deduction to others. The elimination of early male retirement has already produced strong 
tensions and due to further significant rise in the normal retirement age, it will become 
unbearable. In addition, the special favor does not apply to those females whose careers are 
fragmented and whose average net earning is below those of the beneficiaries.  
The new and ad hoc Females 40+ (promulgated just in January 2016) tries to mitigate 
this problem by an awkward way: for several months, the government is ready to pay the full 
compensation of those unemployed and previously low-paid females to accumulate 40 years 
of rights, who deserve help––even by the government’s evaluation. The fair solution is so 
obvious: actuarial reduction of benefits at early retirement! 
It would be socially optimal to close down Females 40 and introduce the flexible rules 
which are satisfactory to the employees and the government. The longer the Hungarian 
government insists on the exceptional/rigid system, the stronger tensions will be 
accumulated. In our opinion, even having introduced a flexible system, following a rigid 
social norm, a lot of workers would still retire as early as possible, even if they received 
reduced pensions. At the same time, we hope that with carefully designed parameter values 
the foregoing tendency can be limited and a socially optimal system can be created which 
provides room for individual choice within certain limits and at the same time, sustainable. 
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APPENDIX 1. WELFARE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MECHANISMS  
In the main text the gainers and the losers were defined without relying on lifetime utility 
functions. Only direct comparisons were made: the gainers are those who obtain higher 
benefits or have lower net balances in the alternative mechanism than in the flexible one. In 
contrast, Appendix 1 outlines the basics of welfare comparison. Let i =1, 2, …, n be the index 
of various types, fi  be the share in the population, M be the alternative system (e.g. flexible, 
exceptional, rigid). Let Ui(Ri, Si, bi) be the lifetime utility of type i, and V be the utilitarian 
social welfare function: 
V = ∑i fi Ui(Ri, Si, bi). 
To compare two mechanisms M1 and M2, we define M1 is better than M2 if the first provides 
higher welfare than the second. Formally: 
V(M1) > V(M2). 
We conjecture in general and show numerically in particular in Appendix 3 below that in a 
well-calibrated model the flexible mechanism typically provides higher welfare than either 
that with exemption or the rigid; therefore the former is better than the latter. 
APPENDIX 2. PARTIAL RETIREMENT 
International experts have known for a long period that even the so-called flexible retirement 
system is not flexible enough, at least with respect to the system of partial retirement. 
Though the international experiences are not yet encouraging, we hope that not the idea but 
only the practice is bad. Appendix 2 contains a formal description. There are two rather than 
one retirement ages:  R1 and R2, those of the partial and of the full retirement and two rather 
than one length of contribution: S1 and S2. The net lifetime balance is given as  
(1’)  d (R1, R2, S1, S2, w) = τw [S1 +(1– α) S2]– [α eR12,w + eR2,w]b (R1, R2, S 1, S2, T(w)),  
eR12,w  being the number of expected years spent in interval [R1, R2). Of course, if  R1  = R2  or α 
=1, then the partial retirement reduces to the flexible one. For d=0, the NDC is obtained. 
APPENDIX 3. THE IMPACT OF THE RETIREMENT RULES ON THE 
CORRELATION AND WELFARE 
In this Appendix a simple model is constructed where the impact of the retirement rules on 
the correlation coefficient and welfare (numerically represented by relative efficiency) can be 
studied theoretically. We shall show that as we move smoothly from the rigid/lean retirement 
rules to the flexible retirement, the foregoing correlation grows from –1 to 1 and the welfare 
rises. 
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THEORY 
The starting point is that there are groups in the population whose working careers are 
differently fragmented. Let integer n > 1 be the number of groups, k = 1, 2, …, n be the generic 
group index. Let L be the common age when people start working (possibly including the 
years in higher education) and D be the common age when they die. Denote Rk and Sk the 
retirement age and the years of employment, respectively, and 1– φk be the degree of 
fragmentation of type k’s career. Then by definition, Sk=φk (Rk – L). We shall index the 
groups in an increasing order of fragmentation: φk >  φk+1 > 0, and  φ1= 1 (nonfragmented 
career). Let  fk (> 0) be the population share of group k with ∑k fk =1. 
To avoid confusion between the individual based approach in Section 2 and the category-
based approach here, we repeat some definition from Section 2. We need the expected years 
of employment and expected retirement age, respectively: 
ER =∑k fk Rk  and  ES =∑k fk Sk   
and their variances:  
D2R = E(R – ER)2   and  D2S = E(S – ES)2 . 
Finally we define the correlation coefficient between R and S: 
ρ(R, S) = E((R – ER) (S – ES))/( DR DS) if DR > 0 and  DS > 0. 
As is known, –1 ≤ ρ(R, S) ≤ 1, and the equalities hold if and only if S = AR +B, with A < 0 and 
A > 0, respectively. (Note that if all the degrees of fragmentation were close to each other, 
then ρ(R, S) ≈ 1 but this is not the case.) 
The simplest way to model the retirement rules is the following. There is a normal retirement 
age (R*) and there are two critical values: a critical length of employment (So) and a critical 
retirement age (Ro). To make the model meaningful, it is assumed that type 1 (with full 
employment) has at least the critical length of employment if (s)he retires at the normal 
retirement age: So  ≤  R*–L. It is also assumed that the critical retirement age is at most as 
high as the normal: Ro ≤ R*.  
In case of sufficiently long employment, the benefit is proportional to the years of 
employment and the net wage 1–τ, where τ is the contribution rate and γ is the 
proportionality factor (the accrual rate): 
b(R, S) = γ S (1–τ)  if  S  ≥So . 
In case of sufficiently late retirement but still below the normal retirement age and shorter 
than critical employment length (but at least as long as the minimal length Sm), the worker 
can retire with an annual deduction δ1: 
b(R, S) = γ S (1–τ)[1+δ1 (R–R*)](1–τ)   if    Ro  ≤ R  ≤  R*  and  Sm ≤  S  < So. 
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After reaching the normal retirement age, the second rule gives credit rather than deduction: 
b(R, S) = γ S (1–τ)[1+δ2 (R–R*)](1–τ)   if    R ≥  R*  and  S  ≥  Sm. 
Otherwise no retirement is allowed. For simplicity, we introduce the notation  
b[Rk] = b(Rk, φk (Rk – L)). 
Note that our scheme contains the two extreme systems: (i) the permissive and rigid with Ro 
= R* and So < R*–L and (ii) flexible with Ro < R* and So = R*–L.  
To derive the retirement ages as a function of the retirement rules, we posit a standard 
lifetime utility function. It consists of three terms: the utility enjoyed while (i) working, (ii) 
being idle and (iii) being retired: 
U[Rk] =  [log (1–τ) – ε] φk (Rk – L)+ [log C – ε] (1–φk )(Rk – L)+log b[Rk] (D – Rk), 
where ε is the per-period utility loss due to work or unemployment and  C is the value of 
social income. 
Finally, we define the per worker balance of the system, i.e. the difference between 
contributions and benefits:  
B = τ ES –C(ER – ES – L) – E[b[R] (D – R)]. 
Numerical calculation 
Turning to numbers, we choose three types: n =3 and Table A3.1 shows the three types’ 
parameter values. 
Table A3.1.  
Parameters of the three types, normal case 
Types 1 2 3 
Shares fk 0.6 0.3 0.1 
Fragmentation φk 1.0 0.9 0.8 
Disutility εk 1.0 1.3 1.7 
 
Other parameter values are as follows: L=20, R*=62, D = 77, C = 0.25. For γ =0.03, the 
balanced value of c varies around 0.358.  The exceptional/rigid system is characterized by So  
= 40 and Ro  = 62 and the flexible So  = 42, Ro  = 60 and δ1=0.06. We can achieve a smooth 
transition between the two extreme systems with the following equations: 
So  = 40+0.5x, Ro  = 62–0.5x and δ1=0.015 x, x =0, 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
To avoid the ambiguity of the social welfare functions, we introduce the concept of relative 
efficiency. Mechanism y’s relative efficiency with respect to that of x is a positive real number 
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ω, if multiplying the wages and benefits by ω  in x yields the same welfare as the original y. In 
formula: 
V[y] = V[x] +(D–L)log ω, i.e. ω = exp { (V[y] – V[x])/(D–L)}.  
Table A3.2 shows the results. As we claimed in the introduction, during a smooth transition 
from the exceptional/rigid system to the flexible one, the correlation coefficient grows from  
–1 to 1 and the relative efficiency grows from 1 to 1.011. 
Table A3.2.  
Transition from the exceptional/rigid system to the flexible one, normal case 
Annual 
deductio
n 
δ1 
Critical Retirement age for type Corre-
lation 
coeff. 
ρ(R, S) 
Relative 
efficiency 
ω 
length of 
employ- 
ment, So 
retire-
ment 
age, Ro 
1 
R1 
2 
R2 
3 
R3 
0.000 40.0 62.0 60.1 62.0 62.0 –0.875 1.000 
0.015 40.5 61.5 60.6 61.5 61.5 –0.895 1.004 
0.030 41.0 61.0 61.0 61.0 61.0   0.001 1.008 
0.045 41.5 60.5 60.9 60.5 60.5   0.914 1.007 
0.060 42.0 60.0 62.0 60.4 60.0   1.000 1.011 
 
 
In summary, we consider types with various degrees of fragmentation, when the system 
operates with a critical length of contribution and a critical retirement age plus an 
adjustment rate. As we raise the critical length and the deduction rate, while diminish the 
critical age, we move from the exceptional/rigid system toward the flexible system, and the 
signed correlation coefficient between the length and age increases from –1 to 1. This signals 
the improvement of fairness as well. 
A COUNTEREXAMPLE 
To show a case where the exceptional/rigid system is more efficient than the flexible one is, 
we choose parameter values where there is no fragmentation, the labor disutilities 1 and 3 
change places and the start and exit ages are steeply rise with the lifespan. 
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Table A3.3.  
Parameters of the three types, counterexample  
Types 1 2 3 
Shares fk   0.6   0.3   0.1 
Disutility εk   1.0   1.3   1.7 
Start working Lk 16.0 20.0 22.0 
Age at death Dk 70.0 75.0 80.0 
 
Now the outcome of Table A3.4 is totally different from that of Table A3.2. The short-lived 
worker with heavy labor disutility can take early retirement, while the long-lived worker with 
light burden cannot. The correlation coefficient remains strongly negative, while the relative 
efficiency first stagnates then it diminishes. 
Table A3.4.  
Transition from the exceptional/rigid system to the flexible one, 
counterexample 
Annual 
deduction 
δ 
Critical Retirement age for type Corre-
lation 
coeff. 
ρ(R, S) 
Relative 
efficiency 
ω 
length of 
employ- 
ment, So 
retire-
ment 
age, Ro 
1 
R1 
2 
R2 
3 
R3 
0.000 40.0 62.0 57.0 62.0 62.0 –0.877 1.000 
0.015 40.5 61.5 57.0 61.5 61.5 –0.886 1.000 
0.030 41.0 61.0 57.0 61.0 61.4 –0.921 1.001 
0.045 41.5 60.5 57.6 60.5 62.0 –0.990 0.999 
0.060 42.0 60.0 58.1 60.4 62.0 –1.000 0.997 
 
APPENDIX 4. SOME RELEVANT DATA ON THE US SOCIAL SECURITY 
For an international comparison, Appendix 4 cites two relevant tables of the US Social 
Security from Bosworth, Burtless and Zhang (2016). Table A4.1 demonstrates that even in the 
United States, where the employment rate is quite high, about the majority retires at the 
earliest age (62, 4 years below the normal retirement age, being 66) and their share slightly 
decreases with earning. At first sight, it appears that if 42% of the highest third retires as 
soon as possible, then it is excessive, though the reduction is very high: cc. 25%. 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
Table A4.1.  
The shares of earliest and of normal retirement in the US 
Retirement 
Income thirds (%) 
lowest middle upper 
At the earliest age 56.1 48.3 42.3 
Normal retirement 
age 
13.8 18.7 28.3 
 
Table A4.2 displays the dependence of life expectancy at age 50 on income for two cohorts: 
born in 1920 and 1940, females and males, the lowest and highest deciles. As is the case in 
general, males live much shorter than females, but this is especially true for the poor. 
Table A4.2.   
Life expectancy at 50 by gender and income, USA 
Cohort 
Females (year) Males (year) 
poorest richest poorest richest 
1920 80.4 84.1 74.3 79.3 
1940 80.4 90.5 76.0 88.0 
 
Appendix 5. Hungarian labor and pension statistics 
Appendix 5 contains some basic statistics used in converting absolute Hungarian data into 
relative ones.  
Table A5.1.  
Employment rate of population aged 15-74 by selected age groups, percent 
 Males Females 
Year 55–59 60–64  Total 55–59 60–64 Total 
2010 56.3 16.5 54.2 46.6   9.5 43.6 
2011 56.9 17.4 55.0 49.9 11.0 43.7 
2012 61.2 17.0 55.7 49.7 11.2 44.9 
2013 64.9 21.1 57.4 51.4 11.1 45.4 
2014 70.6 26.9 60.8 56.8 13.4 48.0 
Source: Fazekas and Varga (2015, p. 221, Tables 4.13 and 4.14). 
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Table A5.2.  
Nominal and real earnings 
Year Gross earnings 
000 HUFs 
Net earnings 
000 HUFs 
Consumer price 
index (previous year) 
2010 202.5 132.6 104.9 
2011 213.1 141.2 103.9 
2012 223.1 144.1 105.7 
2013 230.7 151.1 101.7 
2014 237.7 155.7 99.8 
Source: Fazekas–Varga (2015, 2015, p. 241, Table 6.1). 
Table A5.3.  
Number of males and females at normal retirement age (2006–2014) 
Year Number of (‘000) 
males females 
2006 51.9  60.8a 
2007 50.3  60.3b 
2008 47.4  64.3b 
2009 51.0 63.7 
2010 55.0 68.8 
2011 57.4 71.1 
2012 60.3 73.7 
2013 60.6 74.7 
2014  59.4c  73.6c 
Remarks. a)-b) The female normal retirement age was only 60 in 2006 and only 61 in 2007 and 
2008. c) Unisex normal retirement age was already somewhat higher than 62 in 2014. 
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